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Polarization Sensitive Array Based Physical-Layer Security
Shiqi Gong, Chengwen Xing, Sheng Chen, Fellow, IEEE, and Zesong Fei
Abstract—We propose a framework exploiting the polarization
sensitive array (PSA) to improve the physical layer security of
wireless communications. Specifically, the polarization difference
among signals is utilized to improve the secrecy rate of wire-
less communications, especially when these signals are spatially
indistinguishable. We firstly investigate the PSA based secure
communications for point-to-point wireless systems from the
perspectives of both total power minimization and secrecy rate
maximization. We then apply the PSA based secure beamforming
designs to relaying networks. The secrecy rate maximization for
relaying networks is discussed in detail under both the perfect
channel state information and the polarization sensitive array
pointing error. In the later case, a robust scheme to achieve secure
communications for relaying networks is proposed. Simulation
results show that the proposed PSA based algorithms achieve
lower total power consumption and better security performance
compared to the conventional scalar array designs, especially
under challenging environments where all received signals at
destination are difficult to distinguish in the spatial domain.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, polarization sensitive
arrays, point-to-point wireless systems, relaying networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of information security in wireless networks has
attracted extensive attention in recent years considering the
openness of wireless links [1], [2]. Traditionally, encryption
techniques are utilized to ensure secure communications,
which are generally applied in the upper layer of network
and have a high design complexity [3]. Therefore, an intrinsic
approach exploring the characteristics of wireless fading chan-
nels to improve information security emerges as a prominent
technique, which is referred to as the physical layer security
[4]. The fundamental theory for physical layer security was
firstly established by Shannon [5]. Following Shannon’s work,
Wyner [6] introduced the famous wiretap channel model
and further defined the channel secrecy capacity. The work
[7] proposed a Gaussian degraded wiretap channel which is
widely used to model the wireless propagation environment.
Based on these pioneering theoretical concepts, a large
amount of literature focusing on various design aspects of
secure communications have sprung up. By applying multiple
antennas at communication nodes to exploit spatial freedom,
these researches aimed to significantly improve the physical
layer security of wireless networks [8]–[11]. For example, an
artificial noise scheme was proposed for wiretap channels in
[8] to study the impact of antenna selection on security perfor-
mance of multi-input multi-output (MIMO) two-way relaying
networks. The work [9] introduced an effective method called
cooperative jamming to confuse the eavesdropper deliberately.
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With the aid of the game theory, a collaborative physical-layer
security transmission scheme was designed in [10] to effec-
tively balance the security performance among different links.
All these works however assume that the wireless channels
are ideally Rayleigh distributed, which ignores the influence
of array directivity and correlation. A technique known as the
directional modulation was also investigated to realize secure
communications. In the work [12], the directional modulation
technique was applied to the phased array to offer security.
Specifically, by shifting each array element’s phase appropri-
ately, the desired symbol phase and amplitude in a given di-
rection is generated. The study [13] on the other hand adopted
the directional modulation technique to enhance the security of
multi-user MIMO systems. Different from the standard secrecy
rate optimization, the secure communications of multi-user
MIMO systems are achieved by increasing the symbol error
rate at the eavesdropper. It can be seen that the directional
modulation technique designs the weighting coefficients of
the phased array. As will be shown, our polarization sensitive
array (PSA) based technique designs the spatial pointing of
each antenna to effectively extract the signals’ polarization
information for realizing secure communications.
Generally, the polarization status, similar to the amplitude
and phase, is a feature of the signal. Many researches have
indicated that the direction-finding performance and short-
wave communication quality can be improved by means of the
polarization difference among signals [14]. However, in many
practical communication scenarios, such as radar and elec-
tronic reconnaissance, the conventional scalar array (CSA) is
widely deployed. In essence, the CSA is the uniformly spaced
linear array with the same spatial properties in all its array
elements. Generally, CSA is blind to the polarization status of
signal and sensitive to the array aperture and signal wavelength
[15]. Worse still, in some specific array alignment, a CSA
may present the morbid response to the polarization status of
signal. Different from the CSA, the PSA consists of a certain
number of antennas with different spatial pointings, which can
be utilized to extract the signal information more meticulously
and comprehensively in a vector way [16], [17]. The spatial
pointings of the PSA offer extra design degrees of freedom for
physical layer security of wireless networks. In most practical
wireless networks, jammer is typically introduced to effec-
tively interfere with the eavesdropper, but it simultaneously
causes the interference to the destination. When the jammer
signal has approximately the same spatial properties as the
source, the CSA based destination beamforming optimization
is unable to suppress the interference, as it can only rely on the
signals’ spatial characteristics. By contrast, since different po-
larization information can be extracted by the spatial pointings
of PSA, the PSA based destination beamforming optimization
is capable of suppressing the interference effectively, even
when the signals are indistinguishable in the spatial domain.
2Therefore, utilizing the PSA to realize secure communications
for wireless networks can achieve superior performance over
the CSA design.
However, most existing PSA related works focus on the
problem of estimating the signal’s direction of arrival (DOA).
In [18], a two-step maximum-likelihood signal estimation
procedure was developed under the PSA. Based on the sparse
polarization sensor measurements, the DOA estimation of the
transmitted signal was conducted in [19]. There also exist
some works specifically related to the optimization of dual-
polarization array to enhance the system capacity. Compared to
the single polarization array, the orthogonal dual polarization
antenna can enhance MIMO spatial multiplexing gain remark-
ably by means of the eigenvalue ratio decomposition [20].
The study [21] designed a linear-polarized dual-polarization
frequency reuse system to increase spectrum utilization and
further improve the system capacity, while the work [22]
compared three different transmission schemes for MIMO
networks to achieve the maximum diversity under a dual-
polarization channel model. All these works do not consider
utilizing PSA to enhance secure communications.
Against the above background, this paper investigates the
PSA based secure transmission strategy for wireless networks.
Specifically, we first consider the PSA based secure communi-
cations for the point-to-point single-input multi-output (SIMO)
network with the aid of jammer. In this case, the secure
beamforming is firstly designed aiming at minimizing the
total transmit power subject to the secrecy rate requirements.
Then the secrecy rate maximization scheme is proposed to
improve the secrecy capacity of SIMO network as much
as possible. Further extending our research into the more
complicated scenario where the relay is employed to enlarge
the communication coverage of source nodes, we consider the
secrecy rate maximization under both perfect channel state
information (CSI) and imperfect PSA pointing, respectively.
It is worth noting that convex optimization techniques [23]
can be utilized to solve the optimization problems formulated
in this paper effectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model of PSA is briefly introduced. In Section III,
the point-to-point secrecy beamforming is designed for SIMO
networks, while the one-way relaying network is considered in
Section IV, where the corresponding secrecy rate optimization
problems are formulated. Section V presents the simulation
results, and our conclusions are given in Section VI.
The normal-faced lower-case letters denote scalars, while
bold-faced lower-case and upper-case letters stand for vectors
and matrices, respectively. | | denotes the absolute value and
‖ ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, while ( )∗, ( )T, ( )H and
( )−1 represent the conjugate, transpose, conjugate transpose
and inverse operators, respectively. An optimal solution is
marked by ⋆, while tr( ) and rank( ) denote the trace and rank
of matrix, respectively. The nth row of matrix A is given
by A[n, :], and the nth-row and mth-column element of A
is A[n,m]. A  0 means that A is a positive semidefinite
matrix. The vector stacking operator vec( ) stacks the columns
of a matrix on top of one another, and diag
{
u1, · · · , uN
}
is
the diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements u1, · · · , uN .
IN is the N × N identity matrix, and 0n×m is the n × m
matrix with all zero elements. a ∼ CN (0, σ2I) means that
a is a complex Gaussian distributed random vector with the
zero mean vector 0 and the covariance matrix σ2I, while
E{ } is the expectation operator. The determinant operation
is denoted by det( ), and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
Finally, j =
√−1, and [a]+ = max{0, a}.
;
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Fig. 1. Polarization sensitive array model: (a) the uniform linear crossed
dipole array with ND antennas, and (b) the polarized ellipse of EM signal.
II. POLARIZATION SENSITIVE ARRAY SYSTEM MODEL
Without loss of generality, we assume that a total of ND
antennas are located in the y-axis and the distance da between
the adjacent antennas is half wavelength, as illustrated in
Fig. 1 (a). Here two plane electromagnetic (EM) signals are
considered, i.e., the desired EM signal sd and the jamming EM
signal sj . They arrive at the ND antennas of the PSA from
different incident angles. As is well known, the EM wave is
traveling in a single direction, where the electric component
and the magnetic component are perpendicular to each other
as well as perpendicular to this propagation direction. Taking
the electric component as an example, we define the transverse
electric field vectors of the EM signal sk as
esk(t) =ehk(t)ǫhk + evk(t)ǫvk , k = d, j, (1)
where ehk(t) and evk(t) are the electric field projections
on the ǫhk and ǫvk directions, respectively. As a result, the
magnetic field biases of the EM signal are ǫvk and −ǫhk ,
respectively, for keeping the orthogonality [24]. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the EM signals are completely polarized
signals which means that the time varying ehk(t) and evk(t)
can be formulated as an ellipse. As described in Fig. 1 (b),
αk and βk are the polarization orientation and ellipse angle,
respectively, which represent the track of the EM signal’s
electric vector and are thereafter called the POA for short.
According to the EM theory [19]–[22], [24]–[26], we can
express the EM signal in a vector form with its DOA (θk, ϕk)
and POA (αk, βk) as follows
ŝk=Ξ
(
θk, ϕk
)
R
(
αk
)
ℓ
(
βk
)
=
[
ŝk(1) · · · ŝk(6)
]T
, k=d, j, (2)
where θk and ϕk are the azimuth and elevation angles of the
EM signal sk, respectively, while
Ξ
(
θk, ϕk
)
=
[
ǫhk ǫvk
ǫvk −ǫhk
]
=

− sin θk cosϕk cos θk
cos θk cosϕk sin θk
0 − sinϕk
cosϕk cos θk sin θk
cosϕk sin θk − cos θk
− sinϕk 0
,
(3)
3R(αk)=
[
cosαk − sinαk
sinαk cosαk
]
and ℓ(βk)=
[
cosβk
j sinβk
]
. (4)
Ξ
(
θk, ϕk
)
is the steering matrix of sk, which is composed
of the electric and magnetic field bases of the EM signal,
while R
(
αk
)
and ℓ
(
βk
)
are the corresponding rotation and
ellipticity matrix of sk, respectively, [26].
In addition to the polarization of EM signals, the antenna
polarization should also be considered. It is noted that only
short dipole antennas are adopted in our work, and thus the
array magnetic response can be neglected. Besides, the polar-
ization sensitive matrix P which represents the polarization
characteristics of the array is defined by the spatial pointing
angles of the ND antennas of the PSA, i.e.,
(
θ(e,n), ϕ(e,n)
)
for 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1, where θ(e,n) and ϕ(e,n) are the azimuth
and elevation pointing angle of the nth antenna of the PSA,
respectively. Mathematically, we have
P=[Pe 0]=

p
(0)
e,x p
(0)
e,y p
(0)
e,z 0 0 0
p
(1)
e,x p
(1)
e,y p
(1)
e,z 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
p
(ND−1)
e,x p
(ND−1)
e,y p
(ND−1)
e,z 0 0 0
, (5)
with p
(n)
e,x
p
(n)
e,y
p
(n)
e,z
=Ge
 sinϕ(e,n) cos θ(e,n)sinϕ(e,n) sin θ(e,n)
cosϕ(e,n)
, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1, (6)
where Ge (generally taking the value of 1) is the antenna
gain when the polarization status of the EM signal perfectly
matches the antenna. Note that the matrix 0 included in
P indicates that the array magnetic response is ignored. In
addition, for the matrix Pe, we have∥∥Pe[n+ 1, :]∥∥2=1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1. (7)
It is worth emphasizing that different from [19], where the
PSA consists of the aligned short dipole antennas, each
antenna of the PSA in our paper is deployed with a different
spatial pointing angle, which becomes an optimization variable
for secure communications.
Furthermore, the space phase matrix Uk of the EM signal
sk impinging on the PSA is given by
Uk =diag
{
uk,0, uk,1, · · · , uk,ND−1
}
, (8)
uk,n =e
−j2π
(
ξ(θk,ϕk)rn
)
/λk
=ejπn sinϕk sin θk , k = d, j, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1, (9)
where ξ(θk, ϕk) = −
[
sinϕk cos θk sinϕk sin θk cosϕk
]
denotes the propagation vector of the EM signal sk, rn =
[0, nda, 0]
T is the position vector of the nth polarization
antenna, and λk is the wavelength of sk. Based on (2), (5)
and (8), the spatio-polarized manifold for the EM signal ŝk is
defined as
aθk,ϕk,αk,βk=UkP ŝk=UkPΞ(θk, ϕk)R(αk)ℓ(βk), (10)
for k = d, j. For notational convenience, we will simplify
aθk,ϕk,αk,βk as ak in the sequel.
For the sake of maximizing secrecy rate, the PSA’s spatial
pointings need to be optimized. In order to perform this
optimization conveniently, the formulation (10) is rewritten as
ak=Uk
[
Pe 0
]
ŝk=UkPe
[
ŝk(1) ŝk(2) ŝk(3)
]T
=Qkp, (11)
for k = d, j, where
p =
[
p(0)e,x · · · p(ND−1)e,x p(0)e,y · · · p(ND−1)e,y p(0)e,z · · · p(ND−1)e,z
]T
=vec
(
Pe
) ∈ R3ND , (12)
Qk=[Uk⊗ŝk(1) Uk⊗ŝk(2) Uk⊗ŝk(3)]∈CND×3ND. (13)
Clearly, the new vector p denotes the PSA’s spatial pointings
and thus becomes our optimization variables.
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Fig. 2. A point-to-point SIMO network with the polarization sensitive array
having ND antennas at destination.
III. POINT-TO-POINT SECRECY BEAMFORMING DESIGN
We consider the simplest but most representative wiretap
channel as a source, a destination and an eavesdropper. In
most cases, the capacity of the wiretap channel is higher than
the main channel owing to the concealment and intention of
the eavesdropper. In order to realize secure communications,
we introduce a jammer to disturb the eavesdropper sufficiently.
In this four-terminal network as depicted in Fig. 2, the source
S and jammer J are equipped with single antenna, while the
eavesdropper E and the destination D are equipped with NE
and ND antennas, respectively. More importantly, in our work,
the ND-antenna PSA at destination D is assumed instead of
the conventional CSA to fully show the advantage of PSA for
secure communications 1.
Let hmn ∼ CN (0, σ2hI) be the channel gain vector from
node m to node n, where m = S, J and n = E. Furthermore,
we assume far field communications related to destination
D, and we denote hSD and hJD as the channel gains from
source S and jammer J to the reference antenna (the first
antenna) of the PSA at destination D, respectively. It is
worth pointing out that the eavesdropper E in our work is
a legitimate, active but non-intended receiver, which means
that E can simultaneously transmit signals to other nodes and
intercept the confidential signal from source. Based on this
assumption, the CSI of eavesdropper E is available through
a training-based channel estimation technique. For the sake
of improving security performance of the SIMO network, a
beamforming vector ωd =
[
ω0 ω1 · · ·ωND−1
]T
satisfying
1Our work can easily be extended to the more general case, where the
eavesdropper is also equipped with the PSA of NE antennas. In fact, in this
case, all our designs and algorithms remains applicable and effective. Due to
the space limitation, the detailed discussions are omitted here.
4((
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSEh
H
SE
)((
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE
)
=(
hHSE
(
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λmax
((
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϑmax
. (18)
min
PS ,PJ ,p
PS + PJ ,
s.t.
1+σ−2pH
(
PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2QHdQd+PJ ∣∣hJD∣∣2QHj Qj)p+σ−4PSPJ∣∣hSD∣∣2∣∣hJD∣∣2Cp
1+σ−2PJ
∣∣hJD∣∣2‖aj‖2 ,
≥ 2R0sec(1 + PShHSE(PJhJEhHJE + σ2eINE)−1hSE),
tr
(
pTFnp
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1, PS ≥ 0, PJ ≥ 0.
(27)
∥∥ωd∥∥2 = 1 is applied to the ND antennas of the PSA to
maximize the received confidential signal to interference plus
noise ratio (SINR). Based on this setting, source S and jammer
J simultaneously transmit the confidential signal ŝd and the
jammer signal ŝj to the destination D and eavesdropper E,
respectively. Here, E
{∣∣ŝd∣∣}2 = E{∣∣ŝj∣∣}2 = 1 is assumed.
Since ŝd and ŝj are far field signals relative to the PSA,
the signals sd and sj impinging on the reference antenna of
the PSA from source S and jammer J are represented as
sd = hSD
√
PS ŝd and sj = hJD
√
PJ ŝj , respectively, where
PS and PJ denote the maximum transmit powers of source S
and jammer J , respectively.
Because both source S and jammer J are far-field narrow-
band synchronized transmitters 2, the change of the complex
envelope of the corresponding EM signal when sweeping
across the PSA is negligible. Therefore, the output signals
at the PSA and the eavesdropper E are given respectively as
yD =ω
H
dQdphSD
√
PS ŝd + ω
H
dQjphJD
√
PJ ŝj + ω
H
d nD,
(14)
yE =ω
H
e hSE
√
PS ŝd + ω
H
e hJE
√
PJ ŝj + ω
H
e nE , (15)
where ωe ∈ CNE with
∥∥ωe∥∥2 = 1 is the receive beamforming
vector of eavesdropper E, while nD ∼ CN
(
0, σ2IND
)
and
nE ∼ CN
(
0, σ2eINE
)
are the received Gaussian noise vectors
at destination D and eavesdropper E, respectively. From the
perspective of eavesdropper E, the optimal ωe is designed to
achieve the maximum amount of wiretapped information, i.e.,
to maximize its desired SINR, which is obtained by solving
the following problem
max
ωe
ωHe hSEh
H
SEωe
ωHe
(
PJhJEhHJE + σ
2
eINE
)
ωe
. (16)
Clearly, the above problem is a standard generalized Rayleigh
quotient problem, whose optimal solution is the generalized
eigenvector corresponding to the largest generalized eigen-
value of the matrix pencil
(
hSEh
H
SE , PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)
[28]. Owing to the fact that the matrix PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
2Synchronizing the transmissions of source and jammer is important. To
achieve the synchronization between two transmitters, one of the transmitters
can serve as master and the other as slave, see for example [27]. In our case,
the source serves as the master, who broadcasts the carrier and timing signals,
while the jammer acts as the slave, who locks up to the carrier and timing
signals from the master. In this way, the jammer acquires the carrier frequency
and phase as well as achieves the timing synchronization with the source.
is nonsingular, the optimal eavesdropper’s receive beamform-
ing vector ωe is equivalent to the normalized eigenvec-
tor associated with the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix(
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSEh
H
SE , that is,
ω⋆e =ceϑmax
((
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSEh
H
SE
)
, (17)
where ce is a normalized factor to satisfy ‖ωe‖ = 1 and
ϑmax(A) denotes the eigenvector corresponding to the max-
imum eigenvalue of the matrix A. Considering the rank-
1 property of the matrix PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE , the ma-
trix
(
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSEh
H
SE is also rank-1 and
only has one nonzero eigenvalue. Specifically, we have the
formulation (18) given at the top of this page. Thus the
unique nonzero eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector
are hHSE
(
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE and
(
PJhJEh
H
JE +
σ2eINE
)−1
hSE , respectively. Thus, the optimal eavesdropper’s
receive beamforming vector (17) can be written as
ω⋆e =
PJ (hJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE )
−1hSE
‖(hJEhHJE + σ2eINE )−1hSE‖
. (19)
Based on (14) as well as (15) and (19), we formulate the
received SINRs at destination D and eavesdropper E as
SINRD =
PS |hSD|2
∣∣ωHdQdp∣∣2
ωHd
(
σ2IND + PJ
∣∣hJD∣∣2QjppTQHj )ωd , (20)
SINRE =
PS
(
ω⋆e
)H
hSEh
H
SEω
⋆
e(
ω⋆e
)H(
PJhJEhHJE + σ
2
eINE
)
ω⋆e
=PSh
H
SE
(
PJhJEh
H
JE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE , (21)
respectively, where pT = pH applies because p is a real vector.
To realize secure communication of the SIMO network, the
security metric called the maximum achievable secrecy rate
[6] is considered, which is defined as follows
Rsec ≤
[
I(yD, ŝd)− I(yE , ŝd)
]+
, (22)
where Rsec denotes the achievable secrecy rate, I(yD, ŝd)
is the mutual information between source and destination,
and I(yE , ŝd) is the mutual information between source and
eavesdropper. With the assumption of Gaussian wireless chan-
nels, I(yD, ŝd) and I(yE , ŝd) can readily be calculated as
I(yD, ŝd) = log2
(
1 + SINRD
)
and I(yE , ŝd) = log2
(
1 +
5SINRE
)
, respectively. Thus the maximum achievable secrecy
rate of the SIMO network is formulated as
Rmaxsec =
log2
1+
PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2∣∣ωHdQdp∣∣2
ωH
d
(
σ2IND+PJ
∣∣hJD∣∣2QjppTQHj )ωd
1+PShHSE
(
PJhJEhHJE + σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE

+
.
(23)
For the point-to-point SIMO network, we consider two op-
timization problems, which are the total power minimization
under secrecy rate constraint and the secrecy rate maximization
under transmit power constraints, respectively.
A. Total Power Minimization
The optimization problem is defined as the one that mini-
mizes the total transmit power of the SIMO network subject
to the minimum secrecy rate constraint R0sec, that is,
min
PS ,PJ ,p,ωd
PS + PJ ,
s.t. log2
1+
PS
∣∣
hSD
∣∣2∣∣
ωH
d
Qdp
∣∣2
ωH
d
(
σ2IND
+PJ
∣∣
hJD
∣∣2
Qjpp
TQH
j
)
ωd
1+PShHSE
(
PJhJEhHJE+σ
2
eINE
)−1
hSE
≥ R0sec,
PS ≥ 0, PJ ≥ 0, tr
(
pTFnp
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1,
(24)
where Fn =
(
F
1
2
n
)T
F
1
2
n and F
1
2
n =
[
03×n F 03×(ND−n−1)
]
,
in which the sparse matrix F ∈ R3×(2ND+1) is defined as
F[i, j]=
{
1, (i, j)∈{(1, 1), (2, ND+1), (3, 2ND+1)},
0, otherwise.
(25)
Note that the constraint tr
(
pTFnp
)
= 1 in (24) is equivalent
to the property of PSA spatial pointings given in (7). When
PS and PJ are given, the optimal ωd for the problem (24) is
obtained, similar to the derivation of ω⋆e , as
ω
opt
d =
(σ2IND + PJ
∣∣hJD∣∣2QjppTQHj )−1Qdp
‖(σ2IND + PJ
∣∣hJD∣∣2QjppTQHj )−1Qdp‖ . (26)
Next we substitute (26) into (24) to reformulate the total power
minimization problem as (27), which is given at the top of
this page. Unfortunately, because of the nonlinear and coupled
term Cp, which is given by
Cp=p
TQHdQdpp
TQHj Qjp−pTQHdQjppTQHj Qdp≥0, (28)
the optimization problem (27) is generally nonconvex and
difficult to solve directly. Hence we propose a suboptimal
algorithm for the optimization problem (27), i.e., (24). With
this method, the optimization of p is performed independently
from PS and PJ . Specifically, since the received desired signal
strength at destination D in the SIMO network satisfies
PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2∣∣ωHdQdp∣∣2 ≤PS∣∣hSD∣∣2∥∥ωd∥∥2∥∥Qdp∥∥2
=PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2tr(QHdQdppT), (29)
we can consider the term PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2tr(QHdQdPc) as the
optimization objective for the PSA spatial pointings p by in-
troducing Pc = pp
T. Thus, the secrecy optimization problem
with respect to p can be formulated as
max
Pc
PS
∣∣hSD∣∣2tr(QHdQdPc),
s.t. Pc  0, rank
(
Pc
)
= 1, tr
(
QHj QjPc
)
= 0,
tr(FnPc
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1.
(30)
where the constraint tr
(
QHj QjPc
)
= 0 indicates that the
interference introduced by jammer J to destination D can be
canceled completely. However, the problem (30) is nonconvex
and NP-hard due to the rank-1 constraint.
In order to find an efficient way of solving the optimization
(30), we firstly relax it to a standard semidefinite programming
(SDP) problem by neglecting the rank-1 constraint temporar-
ily. Then the penalty based method [29] is utilized to obtain
the finally rank-1 satisfied solution for the problem (30). To
be specific, let P optc be the optimal solution of (30) without
considering the rank-1 constraint. Then tr
(
QHdQdP
opt
c
)
is
actually an upper bound of tr
(
QHdQdPc
)
in the objective
function of the problem (30). With the penalty based method,
this P optc is adopted as the initial point P
(0)
c for the iterative
optimization given in (31):
P
(t+1)
c = argmin
Pc
tr
(
Pc
)−λmax(P (t)c )
− tr
(
ϑ
(t)
max
(
ϑ
(t)
max
)H(
Pc−P (t)c
))
,
s.t. tr
(
QHdQdPc
) ≤ γ,Pc  0, tr(QHj QjPc)=0,
tr
(
FnPc
)
=1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1,
(31)
where the auxiliary variable γ satisfying 0 ≤ γ ≤
tr
(
QHdQdP
opt
c
)
, and the superscript (t) denotes the iteration
number, while λmax
(
P
(t)
c
)
is the maximum eigenvalue of
P
(t)
c and ϑ
(t)
max denotes the corresponding eigenvector. For a
fixed γ, we can obtain the optimal rank-1 satisfied solution
P optc by solving the optimization problem (31) iteratively,
and the corresponding optimal popt is calculated through the
eigenvalue decomposition of P optc . We utilize the bisection
method [30] to perform one-dimensional search for obtaining
the optimal auxiliary variable γ⋆, so as to obtain the optimal
solution p⋆. The convergence of utilizing this penalty based
method to solve the problem (31) is proved in Appendix.
Once the optimal p⋆ is given, the optimal ω⋆d and the SINR
at destination are derived respectively from (26) and (20) as
ω⋆d =Qdp
⋆/‖Qdp⋆‖, (32)
SINRD =σ
−2PS |hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2. (33)
By substituting p⋆ and ω⋆d into the original problem (24), the
reformulated total power minimization problem is given by
min
PS ,PJ
PS + PJ ,
s.t. log2
(
1+σ−2PS |hSD|
2‖Qdp
⋆‖2
1+PShHSE(PJhJEh
H
JE
+σ2eINE )
−1hSE
)
≥R0sec,
PS ≥ 0, PJ ≥ 0.
(34)
6After performing some mathematical transformations, we have
min
PS ,PJ
PS + PJ ,
s.t. σ2e(2
R0sec − 1)+(2R0sec − 1)‖hJE‖2PJ
+(2R
0
sec‖hSE‖2−σ2eσ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2)PS
+
(
2R
0
secσ−2e a
−σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2‖hJE‖2
)
PSPJ ≤ 0,
PS ≥ 0, PJ ≥ 0,
(35)
where a = ‖hSE‖2‖hJE‖2 − |hHSEhJE |2. For effectively
solving the optimization problem (35), we consider different
cases of the required secrecy rate threshold R0sec, which
corresponds to different optimal solutions of PS+PJ . Firstly,
two bounds of R0sec are defined as
R1 = log2
(
σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2
σ−2e ‖hSE‖2
)
, (36)
R2 = log2
(
σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2‖hJE‖2
σ−2e a
)
, (37)
Based on (36) and (37), the following three cases of R0sec are
discussed.
1) Case 1. R1 < R
0
sec < R2: In this case, the optimization
problem (35) is actually a standard geometric programming
(GP) problem, which is
min
PS ,PJ
PS + PJ ,
s.t. g2P
−1
S + g3P
−1
J + g1P
−1
S P
−1
J ≤ 1
PS ≥ 0, PJ ≥ 0.
(38)
where
g1 =
σ2e(2
R0sec − 1)
(σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2‖hJE‖2 − 2R0secσ−2e a)
, (39)
g2 =
(2R
0
sec − 1)‖hJE‖2
(σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2‖hJE‖2 − 2R0secσ−2e a)
, (40)
g3 =
(2R
0
sec‖hSE‖2 − σ2eσ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2)
(σ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2‖hJE‖2 − 2R0secσ−2e a)
. (41)
Obviously, this optimization can be efficiently solved using the
convex optimization technique to yield corresponding optimal
total transmit power P ⋆S + P
⋆
J .
2) Case 2. R0sec ≤ R1: In fact, the expression R1 denotes
the maximum secrecy rate of the SIMO network without intro-
ducing jammer J under a high SINR condition. If R0sec ≤ R1
is required, it makes no sense to introduce jammer J and thus
PJ = 0 is designed. Therefore, the optimization problem (35)
is transformed into
min
PS
PS ,
s.t.
(
2R
0
sec‖hSE‖2 − σ2eσ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2
)
PS
+σ2e
(
2R
0
sec − 1) ≤ 0,
PS ≥ 0,
(42)
which has the optimal source transmit power P ⋆S as
P ⋆S =
σ2e
(
2R
0
sec − 1)
2R
0
sec‖hSE‖2 − σ2eσ−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2
. (43)
In this case, the optimal total power consumption is then given
by P ⋆S + P
⋆
J = P
⋆
S .
3) Case 3. R0sec ≥ R2: When jammer J is introduced to
promote secure communications of the SIMO network, the
maximum achievable secrecy rate is expressed as R2. That
is, if the required secrecy rate threshold R0sec ≥ R2, the
optimization problem (35) is infeasible.
In summary, by combining the optimization problems (31),
(32) and (35), the total power minimization problem (24) can
be solved efficiently in a suboptimal way by optimizing the
PSA spatial pointings p, the receive beamforming vector ωd
and the total transmit power PS + PJ , separately.
B. Secrecy Rate Maximization
We now investigate the secrecy rate maximization of the
SIMO network subject to the total transmit power constraint
Pmax. Similar to the total power minimization of (24), the
secrecy rate optimization problem is formulated as
max
PS ,PJ ,ωd,p
log2
1+
PS |hSD |
2|ωH
d
Qdp|
2
ωH
d
(
σ2IND
+PJ |hJD |
2Qjpp
TQH
j
)
ωd
1+PShHSE(PJhJEh
H
JE
+σ2eINE )
−1hSE
,
s.t. tr
(
pTFnp
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1,
PS + PJ ≤ Pmax, PJ ≥ 0, PS ≥ 0.
(44)
Likewise, the problem (44) is difficult to solve directly.
However, it is known that the secrecy rate maximization
problem with total power constraint is equivalent to the total
power minimization problem with the secrecy rate threshold
in essence. As a result, we can also apply the proposed sub-
optimal algorithm for problem (24) to the problem (44). The
concrete solutions are presented as follows. Firstly, according
to (30), the PSA spatial pointings P is optimized to maximize
the received signal strength at destination with eliminating the
interference introduced by jammer. Then the joint optimiza-
tion among remaining variables {PS , PJ ,ωd} is performed.
Particularly, the optimal ωd for problem (44) is not related
to {PS , PJ} due to the zero interference tr
(
QHj QjPc
)
= 0
required in (30). As such, we can derive the optimal ωd
by maximizing the destination SINR as in (32). Further, the
joint optimization of {PS , PJ} is presented in the following
problem (45) based on the obtained P and ωd.
max
PS ,PJ
log2
1+σ−2PS |hSD|
2‖Qdp
⋆‖2
1+PShHSE(PJhJEh
H
JE
+σ2eINE )
−1hSE
,
s.t. PS + PJ ≤ Pmax, PJ ≥ 0, PS ≥ 0.
(45)
It is natural that the optimal solution of the problem (45)
is achieved when the constraint PS + PJ = Pmax holds.
Therefore, we further rewrite the problem (45) as
max
0≤PS≤Pmax
f(PS), (46)
where
f(PS) =
l5P
2
S − l4PS − l1
l3P 2S − l2PS − l1
, (47)
and
l1 = σ
2
e + Pmax‖hJE‖2,
l2 = ‖hSE‖2 − ‖hJE‖2 + Pmaxl3,
l3 = σ
−2
e a
l4 = σ
−2|hSD|2‖Qdp⋆‖2
(
Pmax|hJE |2 + σ2e
)− ‖hJE‖2,
l5 = σ
−2‖Qdp⋆‖2|hSD|2‖hJE‖2.
(48)
7It can be seen that the optimization problem (46) is an
unconstrained quadratically fractional function maximization
problem, whose the optimal solution P ⋆S can easily be derived
by the quadratic discriminant method, which is
P ⋆S =min
{
Pmax, P
′
S
}
, (49)
with
P
′
S=
[
−l1(l3−l5)+
√
l21(l3−l5)2−l1(l3l4−l5l2)(l4−l2)
l3l4 − l5l2
]+
.
(50)
Once the optimal P ⋆S is obtained, the optimal P
⋆
J = Pmax−P ⋆S .
Given the optimal source and jammer transmit powers P ⋆S and
P ⋆J , we can accordingly determine the maximum achievable
secrecy rate of the SIMO network via (23). It is worth re-
iterating that the ‘optimal’ PSA spatial pointing vector p⋆,
the receive beamforming vector ω⋆d , the transmit power pairs
P ⋆S and P
⋆
J so obtained do not offer an optimal solution of
the optimization problem (44). Rather they only provide a
suboptimal solution.
IV. RELAY AIDED SECRECY BEAMFORMING DESIGN
We now extend the secure beamforming design to the relay-
ing network with PSA. Specifically, two cases are considered,
where the first case assumes that the perfect CSI in the relay
network is available and the other one considers the imperfect
PSA spatial pointings. For the both cases, we aim at improving
the secrecy rate of the relaying network as much as possible.
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Fig. 3. A two-hop network with the polarization sensitive array having NR
antennas at relay.
As shown in Fig. 3, source S, destination D, eavesdropper
E and jammer J are all equipped with single-antenna, while
relay R employs the NR-antenna PSA. Owing to the limit
coverage of S, there exists no direct communication link
between S and D. Therefore, S transmits confidential signal̂˜sd to D via R. Specifically, in the first phase known as
multiple access (MAC) phase, S transmits ̂˜sd to R, and then
in the second phase called broadcast (BC) phase, R forwards
the received signal in the first phase to D. Again, owing to
the existence of eavesdropper E, jammer J is introduced to
transmit jamming signal ̂˜sj to decrease the information leakage
which happens between S and R as well as between R and
D. The transmissions of source S and jammer J in the MAC
phase are synchronized, while the transmissions of relay R
and jammer J in the BC phase are also synchronized. For this
relay network, it is reasonable to assume that source transmits
signal using maximum transmit power.
A. Secrecy Rate Maximization with Perfect CSI
Similar to Section III, the scalar hmn ∼ CN (0, σ2h) denotes
the flat-fading and quasi-static channel from node m to node
n wherem = S, J and n = E, while hSR and hJR denote the
channel gains from source S and jammer J to the reference
antenna of the relay’s PSA, respectively. Furthermore, the CSI
of eavesdropper E is assumed to be available. Based on these
assumptions, the received signals at the NR antennas of relay
R in the MAC phase can be expressed as
yR =Q˜dp˜hSR
√
PŜ˜sd + Q˜j p˜hJR√P (1)J ̂˜sj + nR, (51)
where ̂˜sd and ̂˜sj are the transmit signals of source S and
jammer J , respectively, with E
{|̂s˜d|2} = E{|̂s˜j |2} = 1, PS
and P
(1)
J are the transmit powers of source S and jammer J ,
respectively, while nR ∈ CNR is the Gaussian noise vector
at relay R whose elements follow the distribution CN (0, σ2r).
The spatio-polarized manifold matrices Q˜k ∈ CNR×3NR for
k = d, j are defined similarly to (13), and the relay’s PSA
spatial pointing vector p˜ ∈ R3NR is defined similarly to (12).
The wiretapped signal at E in this phase is given by
y
(1)
E =hSE
√
PŜ˜sd + hJE√P (1)J ̂˜sj + n(1)E
=hSE
√
PŜ˜sd + n̂(1)E , (52)
where the additive Gaussian noise n
(1)
E follows the distribution
CN (0, σ2e), and n̂(1)E = hJE
√
P
(1)
J
̂˜sj + n(1)E .
In the BC phase, relay R utilizes the amplify-and-forward
(AF) strategy to forward the received signal yR. To be specific,
the retransmitted signal is y
′
R =WyR, whereW ∈ CNR×NR
denotes the AF beamforming matrix. Thus, the transmit power
of R is given by
PR =PS |hSR|2‖WQ˜dp˜‖2 + P (1)J |hJR|2‖WQ˜jp˜‖2
+ σ2tr
(
WWH
)
. (53)
Simultaneously, jammer J sends the interference signal ̂˜s(2)j
with power P
(2)
J toD. Let hRD ∈ C1×NR and hRE ∈ C1×NR
be the channel gain vectors from the NR antennas of relay R
to destination D and eavesdropper E, respectively, while hJD
denotes the channel gain from J to D. Then the received
signals at D and E are formulated respectively as
yD =hRDR
1
2
cory
′
R +
√
P
(2)
J hJD
̂˜s(2)j + nD
=hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜hSR
√
PŜ˜sd + n̂D, (54)
y
(2)
E =hRER
1
2
cory
′
R +
√
P
(2)
J hJE
̂˜s(2)j + n(2)E
=hRER
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜hSR
√
PŜ˜sd + n̂(2)E . (55)
Due to the fact that relay R adopts the PSA as the transmit
array, its antenna correlation matrix Rcor ∈ CNR×NR must
be considered, whose elements follow the exponential model
of Rcor[n,m] = p
|n−m| for 1 ≤ n,m ≤ NR with constant
p [31]. The additive Gaussian noises at destination D and
eavesdropper E are nD ∼ CN (0, σ2d) and n(2)E ∼ CN (0, σ2e),
8OE =
[
σ2e + P
(1)
J |hJE |2 P (1)J hJEh∗JR
(
hRER
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜
)∗
P
(1)
J
(
hRER
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜
)
hJRh
∗
JE P
(1)
J |hJR|2|hRER
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜|2 +Ke
]
, (59)
OD =P
(1)
J |hJR|2|hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜|2 + P (2)J |hJD|2 + σ2r‖hRDR
1
2
corW ‖2 + σ2d, (60)
respectively, while the equivalent noise-plus-interference terms
n̂D and n̂
(2)
E are given by
n̂D =hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜hJR
√
P
(1)
J
̂˜sj +√P (2)J hJD̂˜s(2)j
+ hRDR
1
2
corWnR + nD, (56)
n̂
(2)
E =hRER
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜hJR
√
P
(1)
J
̂˜sj +√P (2)J hJÊ˜s(2)j
+ hRER
1
2
corWnR + n
(2)
E . (57)
Clearly, the total amount of information leakage to E comes
from both S and R, as indicated in (52) and (55). Hence, the
wiretapped information in the relay network is given by
yE =
[
hSE
hRER
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜hSR
]√
PŜ˜sd +
[
n̂
(1)
E
n̂
(2)
E
]
=HE
√
PŜ˜sd + n̂E . (58)
The covariance matrix OE of n̂E and OD = E
{∣∣n̂D∣∣2} are
given by (59) and (60), respectively, at the top of the next
page, in which Ke = P
(2)
J |hJE |2+σ2r‖hTRER
1
2
corW ‖2+σ2d.
Correspondingly, the achievable secrecy rate region of this
relaying network is
R˜sec ≤
[
I˜
(
yD, ̂˜sd)− I˜(yE , ̂˜sd)]+, (61)
in which the mutual information between source S and des-
tination D and the mutual information between source S and
eavesdropper E are given respectively by
I˜
(
yD, ̂˜sd)=log2(1+PS|hSR|2|hRDR 12corWQ˜dp˜|2/OD), (62)
I˜
(
yE , ̂˜sd)=log2 det (I2+PSHEHHEO−1E ) . (63)
The optimization problem for the proposed secure beamform-
ing design is formulated as
max
P
(1)
J
,P
(2)
J
,W ,p˜
log2
1+
PS |hSD |
2|hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜|
2
OD
det
(
I2+PSHEHHEO
−1
E
) ,
s.t. tr
(
p˜TF˜np˜
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ NR − 1,
PS |hSR|2‖WQ˜dp˜‖2 + P (1)J |hJR|2‖WQ˜j p˜‖2
+σ2r tr
(
WWH
) ≤PmaxR ,
0 ≤ P (1)J + P (2)J ≤ PmaxJ ,
(64)
where the definition of F˜n ∈ R3NR×3NR is similar to that
of Fn given in Section III-A, while P
max
R and P
max
J are the
maximum relay and jammer transmit powers, respectively. It
can be observed that the objective function of this problem is a
product of two correlated generalized Rayleigh quotients and
is obviously nonconvex. Thus this optimization is difficult to
solve directly. Since eavesdropper E is a legitimate although
not an intended receiver, we assume that the perfect CSI of E
is available. Then the following operations are performed.
1) As the perfect CSI of E is available, the beamforming
matrix W is designed to satisfy hRER
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜ = 0. Thus
the information leakage from R to E is canceled completely.
With this beamforming matrix design, jammer J does not need
to transmit signal ̂˜s(2)j to decrease the information leakage
caused by R, which means that P
(2)
J = 0.
2) As destination D is disturbed by the forwarded jammer
signal ̂˜sj from the MAC phase, the beamforming matrix W
should be designed to satisfy hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜ = 0 to elimi-
nate the interference to D caused by jammer J completely.
3) Since only jammer signal ̂˜sj is utilized to decrease the
information leakage to E in the MAC phase and P
(2)
J = 0,
we can set P
(1)
J = P
max
J to interfere eavesdropper maximally.
Thus the power allocation for jammer J is determined.
With the operations 1) to 3), the information leakage
only occurs in the MAC phase, and the mutual information
I˜
(
yD, ̂˜sd) and I˜(yE , ̂˜sd) are simplified as
I˜
(
yD, ̂˜sd)=log2(1+PS|hSR|2|hRDR 12corWQ˜dp˜|2/OD), (65)
I˜
(
yE , ̂˜sd)=log2(1 + PS |hSE |2σ2e + PmaxJ |hJE |2
)
. (66)
Thus the secrecy rate maximization problem (64) can be re-
expressed as
max
W ,p˜
log2
1+
PS |hSR|
2|hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜|
2
σ2
d
+σ2r‖hRDR
1
2
corW‖
2
1+
PS |hSE |
2
σ2e+P
max
J
|hJE |
2
,
s.t. tr
(
p˜TF˜np˜
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ NR − 1,
hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜ = 0, hRER
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜ = 0,
PS |hSR|2‖WQ˜dp˜‖2+PmaxJ |hJR|2‖WQ˜jp˜‖2
+ σ2r tr(WW
H) ≤ PmaxR .
(67)
Unfortunately, this problem is still neither convex nor concave
with respect toW and p˜. Similar to solving (24), we propose
an iterative suboptimal algorithm to solve (67) effectively.
1) Optimization of W : When the PSA spatial pointing
vector is fixed to p˜ = p˜(l−1) where l is the outer iteration
index and tr
((
p˜(l−1)
)T
F˜np˜
(l−1)
)
= 1 for 0 ≤ n ≤ NR − 1,
the problem (67) is transformed into
max
W
1 +
PS |hSR|2|hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜
(l−1)|2
σ2d + σ
2
r‖hRDR
1
2
corW ‖2
,
s.t.hRDR
1
2
corWQ˜j p˜
(l−1) = 0,
hRER
1
2
corWQ˜dp˜
(l−1) = 0,
PS |hSR|2‖WQ˜dp˜(l−1)‖2 + PmaxJ |hJR|2‖WQ˜jp˜(l−1)‖2
+ σ2r tr(WW
H) ≤ PmaxR . (68)
9µ =
((
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H(
PmaxR Gb + PS |hSR|2R(l−1)d + PmaxJ |hJR|2R(l−1)j + σ2rIN2R
)
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)−1(
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H
g
(l−1)
d , (78)
c
(
p˜(l−1)
)
=
√
PmaxR
/(
µH
(
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H(
PS |hSR|2R(l−1)d + PmaxJ |hJR|2R(l−1)j + σ2rIN2R
)
G
(l−1)⊥
je µ
)
. (79)
After some manipulations, (68) can be rewritten as
max
ωR
1 +
PS |hSR|
2ωHRG
(l−1)
d
ωR
σ2
d
+σ2rω
H
R
GbωR
,
s.t.
(
g
(l−1)
j
)H
ωR = 0,
(
g
(l−1)
e
)H
ωR = 0,
ωHR
(
PS |hSR|2R(l−1)d +PmaxJ |hJR|2R(l−1)j
+σ2rIN2R
)
ωR ≤ PmaxR ,
(69)
where
ωR=vec(W ) ∈ CN2R , (70)
g
(l−1)
k =
(
Q˜kp˜
(l−1)
)∗⊗(hRDR 12cor)H ∈ CN2R , k = d, j, (71)
g(l−1)e =
(
Q˜dp˜
(l−1)
)∗⊗(hRER 12cor)H ∈ CN2R , (72)
G
(l−1)
d =g
(l−1)
d
(
g
(l−1)
d
)H
, (73)
Gb=
(
INR⊗
(
hRDR
1
2
cor
)H)(
INR ⊗
(
hRDR
1
2
cor
))
, (74)
R
(l−1)
k =
((
Q˜kp˜
(l−1)
)∗⊗INR)((Q˜kp˜(l−1))T⊗INR),
k = d, j. (75)
Let G
(l−1)⊥
je be the projection matrix onto the null space of
G
(l−1)
je =
[
g
(l−1)
j g
(l−1)
e
]H
. Then the N2R-dimensional relay
beamforming vector is denoted as ωR = G
(l−1)⊥
je ω˜R, which
transforms the original optimization variable ωR into ω˜R.
Thus, the problem (69) can be rewritten as
max
ω˜R
1 +
PS |hSR|
2ω˜HR
(
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H
G
(l−1)
d
G
(l−1)⊥
je
ω˜R
σ2
d
+σ2r ω˜
H
R
(
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H
GbG
(l−1)⊥
je
ω˜R
,
s.t. ω˜HR
(
G
(l−1)⊥
je
)H(
PS |hSR|2R(l−1)d +
PmaxJ |hJR|2R(l−1)j +σ2rIN2R
)
G
(l−1)⊥
je ω˜R≤PmaxR .
(76)
The problem in (76) is also a generalized Rayleigh quotient
problem, which has the closed-form solution
ω˜
(l)
R = c
(
p˜(l−1)
)
µ, (77)
with µ and c
(
p˜(l−1)
)
given by (78) and (79), respectively, at
the top of this page. Once the optimal ω˜
(l)
R is obtained, the
optimal W (l) can be derived based on ω
(l)
R = G
(l−1)⊥
je ω˜
(l)
R .
2) Optimization of p˜: Given W (l), the optimization prob-
lem (67) is rewritten as
max
p˜
1+
PS |hSR|
2p˜HQ˜Hd
(
W (l)
)H(
R
1
2
cor
)H
hHRDhRDR
1
2
corW
(l)Q˜dp˜
σ2
d
+σ2r‖hRDR
1
2
corW
(l)‖2
,
s.t. tr
(
p˜TF˜np˜
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ NR − 1,
hRDR
1
2
corW
(l)Q˜j p˜ = 0, hRER
1
2
corW
(l)Q˜dp˜ = 0,
PS |hSR|2‖W (l)Q˜dp˜‖2+PmaxJ |hJR|2‖W (l)Q˜j p˜‖2
+ σ2r tr(W
(l)
(
W (l)
)H) ≤ PmaxR .
(80)
To simplify this complicated nonconvex problem, we define
P
(l)
je =
[
hRDR
1
2
corW
(l)Q˜j
hRER
1
2
corW
(l)Q˜d
]
∈ C2×3NR . (81)
Then the feasible p˜ must be in the null-space of P
(l)
je .
Therefore, p˜ = P
(l)⊥
je
̂˜p, where P (l)⊥je denotes the projection
matrix onto the null space of P
(l)
je and
̂˜p is the equivalent
variable vector to be optimized. By defining the Hermitian
matrix P˜c = ̂˜p̂˜pH, the problem (80) is rewritten as
max
P˜c
PS |hSD|2tr
(
R˜
(l)
d P˜c
)
,
s.t. tr
( ̂˜
F
(l)
n P˜c
)
=1, 0≤n≤NR−1,
P˜c0, rank
(
P˜c
)
=1,
tr
((
PS |hSR|2G˜(l)d +PmaxJ |hJR|2G˜(l)j
)
P˜c
)
≤ PmaxR − σ2r tr
(
W (l)W (l)
H)
,
(82)
where
R˜
(l)
d =
(
P
(l)⊥
je
)H
Q˜Hd
(
W (l)
)H(
R
1
2
cor
)H
hHRDhRD
×R 12corW (l)Q˜dP (l)⊥je , (83)̂˜
F n =
(
P
(l)⊥
je
)H
F˜nP
(l)⊥
je , (84)
G˜
(l)
k =
(
P
(l)⊥
je
)H
Q˜Hk
(
W (l)
)H
W (l)Q˜kP
(l)⊥
je , k = d, j. (85)
It is observed that the problem (82) becomes a standard SDP
problem if the rank-1 constraint is not considered. Similar to
solving (30), we utilize the penalty based method to solve
(82). The corresponding iterative optimization problem (86)
is given at the bottom of this page, where the superscript [t]
denotes the inner iteration index, and υ˜
[t]
max is the eigenvector
corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue λmax
(
P˜
[t]
c
)
. Note
P˜
[t+1]
c = argmin
P˜c
tr
(
P˜c
)− λmax(P˜ [t]c )− tr(υ˜[t]max(υ˜[t]max)H(P˜c − P˜ [t]c ))− tr(R˜(l)d P˜c),
s.t. tr
(
R˜
(l)
d P˜c
) ≤ γ˜, tr((PS |hSR|2G˜(l)d +PmaxJ |hJR|2G˜(l)j )P˜c)≤PmaxR −σ2r tr(W (l)(W (l))H),
P˜c  0, tr
( ̂˜
F
(l)
n P˜c
)
= 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ ND − 1,
(86)
10
max
Wrb
min
∆p˜
log2
(
1+
PS |hSR|
2
∣∣hTRDR 12corWrbQ˜d(p˜⋆+∆p˜)∣∣2
P
(1)
J
|hJR|2
∣∣hT
RD
R
1
2
corWrbQ˜j
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)∣∣2+P (2)
J
|hJD |2+σ2r
∥∥hT
RD
R
1
2
corWrb
∥∥2+σ2
d
)
− log2 det
(
I2+PSHEH
H
EO
−1
E
)
,
s.t. PS |hSR|2‖WrbQ˜d(p˜⋆+∆p˜)‖2+P (1)J |hJR|2‖WrbQ˜j(p˜⋆+∆p˜)‖2+σ2r tr
(
WrbW
H
rb
)≤PmaxR , 0 ≤ P (1)J + P (2)J ≤ PmaxJ .
(90)
max
Wrb
γ¯,
s.t.
PS |hSR|
2
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)H ̂˜
Rd
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)
Pmax
J
|hJR|2
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)H ̂˜
Rj
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)
+σ2r‖h
T
RD
R
1
2
corWrb‖2+σ
2
d
≥ 2γ¯
(
1+ PS |hSE |
2
σ2e+P
max
J
|hJE |2
)
− 1, ∀∆p˜,
PS |hSR|2‖WrbQ˜d(p˜⋆+∆p˜)‖2+σ2r tr
(
WrbW
H
rb
) ≤ PmaxR −PmaxJ |hJR|2‖WrbQ˜j(p˜⋆+∆p˜)‖2, ∀∆p˜,hRER 12corWrbQ˜d=0,
(91)
min
∆p˜∈P
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)H(
PS |hSR|2 ̂˜Rd−aPmaxJ |hJR|2 ̂˜Rj)(p˜⋆+∆p˜) ≥ a(σ2r‖hTRDR 12corWrb‖2+σ2d), (92)
max
∆p˜∈P
(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
)H(
PS |hSR|2Q˜HdWHrbWrbQ˜d+PmaxJ |hJR|2Q˜Hj WHrbWrbQ˜j
)(
p˜⋆+∆p˜
) ≤ PmaxR −σ2r tr(WrbWHrb ). (93)
that the initial P˜
[0]
c and the upper bound γ˜up = tr
(
R˜
(l)
d P˜
[0]
c
)
are derived from the problem (82) without considering the
rank-1 constraint. Furthermore, the penalty based method and
the bisection method are jointly applied to iteratively solve
(86) to obtain the optimal rank-1 satisfied P˜c. This procedure
is terminated when tr
(
P˜
[t+1]
c
) − λmax(P˜ [t+1]c ) ≈ 0. With
the optimal solution P˜
(l)
c = P˜
[t+1]
c , the optimal p˜
(l) can be
obtained by the eigenvalue decomposition on P˜
(l)
c . Since the
iterative optimization (86) has exactly the same form as the
iterative optimization (31), the convergence of the iterative
algorithm for solving (86) is guaranteed.
Thus, instead of jointly optimizing p˜ and W , we optimize
W and p˜ separately in an iterative procedure involving steps
1) and 2). Specifically, with the initial iteration index l = 1 and
a feasible initial p˜(l−1), we obtain the optimal beamforming
matrix W (l) using the closed-form solution (77). Then with
W (l), the optimal PSA pointing vector p˜(l) is determined
by solving (86) iteratively. Because the pair
(
W (l), p˜(l)
)
is
feasible in next iteration to obtain
(
W (l+1), p˜(l+1)
)
, the ob-
jective function in the original problem (67) is monotonously
increasing and it converges to the maximum value as the
iteration index increases. Hence, when a preset termination
criterion is met, the procedure yields the optimal beamforming
matrix W ⋆ and the optimal PSA pointing p˜⋆.
The complexity of this proposed algorithm mainly comes
from the iterative SDP optimization (86) for deriving the PSA
spatial pointing vector. According to [32], the computational
complexity of a standard SDP problem is on the order of
CSDP=O
(
(MsdpN
3.5
sdp+M
2
sdpN
2.5
sdp+M
3
sdpN
0.5
sdp) log(
1
ǫ
)
)
, (87)
where Msdp is the number of semidefinite cone constraints
and Nsdp is the dimension of the semidefinite cone, while ǫ
is the accuracy imposed to solve the SDP problem. Thus the
per-iteration complexity of our proposed algorithm is
Cperfper−ite=O
((
(3NR)
3.5+(3NR)
2.5+(3NR)
0.5
)
log(
1
ǫ
)
)
. (88)
B. Robust Design for Maximizing Secrecy Rate
In the previous subsection, we obtain the optimal PSA
pointing p˜⋆. In most practical deployments, however, the
actual array spatial pointing implemented will deviate from
this ideal one, due to the antenna distortion, operational
environment factors or installation errors. Therefore, it is
necessary to design a robust beamforming under an imperfect
PSA pointing realization p˜act. There exist two types of array
pointing errors. One is modeled as a deterministic matrix with
bounded norm, and the other is unbounded and denoted by
a statistical model of unknown parameters. For simplicity, we
only consider the design of robust relay beamformingWrb for
the bounded PSA pointing error type. Specifically, an ellipsoid
model is utilized to model the PSA spatial pointing error as
p˜act = p˜
⋆ +∆p˜, ∆p˜ ∈ P = {∆p˜ : ∆p˜HC∆p˜ ≤ 1}, (89)
where p˜⋆ is the optimal PSA pointing for the relaying network
obtained in Subsection IV-A,∆p˜ is the elliptical array pointing
error, and the matrix C ≻ 0 determines the accuracy degree
of the PSA pointing, which has the Cholesky decomposition
of C = C
1
2
(
C
1
2
)H
. If the elements of C tend to infinity,
the PSA pointing error approaches zero, i.e., the actual array
structure is perfect. On the other hand, if the elements of C
approach 0, the PSA pointing is extremely inaccurate.
By considering the array pointing error, the resulting robust
secrecy rate maximization problem (90) is formulated at the
top of this page. This optimization is highly complicated, and
we make some operational assumptions in order to simplify it.
First, the robust beamformingmatrixWrb is designed to satisfy
hTRER
1
2
corWrbQ˜d = 0 to cancel the information leakage from
R to E completely. Second, P
(1)
J = P
max
J and P
(2)
J = 0
are also applied to the robust beamforming optimization
with the same reasons as given in Subsection IV-A. Under
these conditions, (90) can be reformulated as the optimization
problem (91) given at the top of this page, where
̂˜
Rk =
(hTRDR
1
2
corWrbQ˜k)
HhTRDR
1
2
corWrbQ˜k, k = d, j, and the lower
bound of γ¯ is zero, while the upper bound of γ¯ is calculated
based on the optimal p˜⋆ and W ⋆ from the perfect CSI case.
11
The first two constraints in the optimization problem (91) can
be expressed as (92) and (93), respectively, given at the top of
this page, where a = 2γ¯(1+PS|hSE |2/(σ2e + PmaxJ |hJE |2))−
1. To promote the standard SDP formulation for the robust
secrecy beamforming design, we employ the S-procedure
lemma [33] to transform (92) and (93) into the linear matrix
inequalities and, consequently, the optimization problem (91)
is reformulated as
max
Wrb,u1,u2
γ¯,
s.t.
[
u1C +ΦPJ Φ
H
PJ p˜
⋆(
p˜⋆
)H
ΦPJ t1
]
 0,[
u2C −ΦJD −ΦHJDp˜⋆
−(p˜⋆)HΦJD t2
]
 0,
hRER
1
2
corWrbQ˜d = 0, u1 > 0, u2 > 0,
(94)
where
t1 =
(
p˜⋆
)H
ΦPJ p˜
⋆ − u1 − σ2ra
(
1+‖hTRDR
1
2
corWrb‖2
)
,
t2 = P
max
R − u2 −
(
p˜⋆
)H
ΦJDp˜
⋆ − σ2r tr
(
WrbW
H
rb
)
,
ΦPJ=PS |hSD|2 ̂˜Rd−aPmaxJ |hJR|2 ̂˜Rj , (95)
ΦJD=PS |hSR|2Q˜HdWHrbWrbQ˜d+PmaxJ |hJR|2Q˜Hj WHrbWrbQ˜j ,
The optimization (94) is still nonconvex with respect to Wrb.
Similar to solving (80), some mathematical transformations
are applied to reformulate (94) into a standard SDP problem
with a rank-1 constraint. Specifically, by defining
W
′
rb =vec(Wrb)vec(Wrb)
H ∈ CN2R×N2R , (96)
the problem (94) is transformed into
max
W
′
rb
,u1,u2
γ¯,
s.t.
[
u1C +Φ
′
PJ Φ
′H
PJ p˜
⋆(
p˜⋆
)H
Φ
′
PJ t
′
1
]
 0,[
u2C −Φ′JD −Φ
′H
JDp˜
⋆
−(p˜⋆)HΦ′JD t′2
]
 0,
tr
( ̂˜
QeW
′
rb
)
= 0, W
′
rb  0, rank(W
′
rb) = 1,
u1 > 0, u2 > 0,
(97)
where
t
′
1 =
(
p˜⋆
)H
Φ
′
PJ p˜
⋆ − u1 − σ2ra
(
1 + tr
(
GbW
′
rb
))
,
t
′
2 = P
max
R − u2 −
(
p˜⋆
)H
Φ
′
JDp˜
⋆ − σ2r tr
(
W
′
rb
)
,
Φ
′
PJ=PS |hSD|2 ̂˜QHd (W ′rb)∗ ̂˜Qd−aPmaxJ |hJR|2 ̂˜QHj (W ′rob)∗ ̂˜Qj ,̂˜
Qk =
(
Q˜k ⊗
(
R
1
2
cor
)T
hRD
)
, k = d, j, (98)
Φ
′
JD = PS |hSR|2D˜d + PmaxJ |hJR|2D˜j,̂˜
Qe =
(
Q˜∗d ⊗
(
hTRER
1
2
cor
)H)(
Q˜Td ⊗ hTRER
1
2
cor
)
,
D˜k[m̂, n̂] = tr
((
Q˜∗k ⊗ INR
)
I˜Hm̂I˜n̂
(
Q˜Tk ⊗INR
)
W
′
rb
)
, k = d, j,
with I˜l =
[
0NR×(l−1)NR INR 0NR×(3NR−l)NR
] ∈ CNR×3N2R ,
for l = m̂, n̂ and 1 ≤ m̂, n̂ ≤ 3NR. The penalty based method
can also be used to solve the problem (97) effectively, and the
obtained W
′⋆
rb guarantees to satisfy the rank-1 property. The
detailed optimization procedure is the same as that presented
in Subsection IV-A. This proposed robust beamforming algo-
rithm is based on the iterative SDP optimization, which is sim-
ilar to the one we used to solve the secrecy rate maximization
with perfect CSI presented in Subsection IV-A. Therefore, it
has the same order of magnitude of the per-iteration complex-
ity as the algorithm of Subsection IV-A, which can be shown to
be Crobuper−ite = O
(
2(N2R)
3.5+4(N2R)
2.5+8(N2R)
0.5) log(1/ǫ)
)
.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulation study, the DOA of desired signal sd
is specified by (θd = 40
◦, ϕd = 90
◦), and its POA is
given by (αd = −30◦, βd = 0◦). For jammer signal sj ,
its DOA is (θj , 90
◦) with θj ∈ [0, π], and its POA is
(αj , βj) with αj ∈ [−π2 , π2 ] and βj ∈ [−π4 , π4 ] . Thus,
the spatial and polarization distances between sd and sj
are given respectively by ∆a = |θj − 40◦| and ∆p =
arccos
(
cos 2βd cos 2βj cos
(
2(αd − αj)
)
+ sin 2βd sin 2βj
)
[34]. The 8-antenna PSA is considered in our simulations and
the antenna spacing is half of the transmit signal wavelength
3. In the SIMO network, the eavesdropper is equipped with
NE = 6 antennas. All channel coefficients are generated
independently according to CN (0, 1) and the power of the
receive additive noise is σ2e = σ
2 = 1. In order to solve the
standard convex optimization problems such as the GP (38)
and the SDP (86) efficiently, the software toolbox CVX [32]
is used. Under this simulation setting, we perform numerical
evaluations for the point-to-point SIMO network and the
relaying network, respectively. In order to demonstrate the
advantages of PSA, the standard CSA based technique is
utilized as a comparison. Specifically, instead of employing
the 8-element PSA, the destination D also employs the CSA
with 8 antennas in the SIMO network case, while the relay
R is also equipped with the 8-element CSA in the relay
network case. All the results are averaged over 500 Monte
Carlo simulations.
For different DOAs of the jammer signal sj , Table I presents
the optimized spatial pointings of the 8-antenna PSA for both
the SIMO network and the relaying network is presented.
The corresponding optimal destination beamforming and relay
beamforming can be derived from (32) and (77), respectively.
A. The SIMO Network
We first consider the security performance of the SIMO net-
work with the proposed algorithm for optimizing the receive
beamforming, power allocation and PSA spatial pointings.
1) Total power minimization: With the 8-antenna PSA,
Fig. 4 depicts the minimum power consumption of the SIMO
network as the function of the secrecy rate threshold R0sec,
under three different polarization distances ∆p with the DOA
of jammer signal sj given by (35
◦, 90◦), which is slightly
difficult from the DOA (40◦, 90◦) of desired signal sd. Thus,
the spatial distance between sd and sj is only ∆a = 5
◦, which
is considered to be very small. Three POA values considered
3Note that our work can also be extended easily to the planar array case with
the different spatial phase matrix. Moreover, since the spatial phase matrix is
not related to any optimization variable, the simulation conclusions obtained
by applying the planar array are similar to that in Section V.
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TABLE I
THE LIST OF MAJOR SIMULATION VARIABLES AND OPTIMIZED RESULTS.
Scenario DOA of sj Optimized 8-element array spatial angles
(
θ(e),ϕ(e)
)
(degrees) for given ∆p
SIMO Network
(
35
◦
, 90
◦
) [(θ(e))T(
ϕ(e)
)T
]
=

[ 17.24 136.24 158.07 40.95 28.56 142.68 148.61 37.59
73.61 −51.26 73.60 −52.79 83.83 −52.79 87.36 −52.06
]
∆p = 20
◦[ 109.87 107.99 66.16 19.03 142.15 143.02 42.10 52.63
−60.87 −44.87 −67.54 −17.06 56.72 64.35 −19.63 58.86
]
∆p = 10
◦[
87.41 88.17 90.56 90.35 88.85 90.81 90.76 90.69
45.17 45.17 45.17 45.17 45.17 45.17 45.17 45.17
]
∆p = 0
◦
(
55
◦
, 90
◦
) [(θ(e))T(
ϕ(e)
)T
]
=

[
65.67 54.43 125.57 118.73 58.17 66.55 114.63 123.94
−66.74 −59.71 −66.31 −54.00 −54.45 −63.38 −57.70 −69.35
]
∆p = 20
◦[
65.71 55.94 124.14 119.30 58.59 65.80 116.15 122.38
−71.70 −58.84 −68.75 −52.39 −52.65 −66.24 −57.48 −74.12
]
∆p = 10
◦[ 71.47 44.56 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 135.44 108.53
63.16 −55.80 85.27 −89.71 20.11 25.30 −55.80 63.17
]
∆p = 0
◦
Relaying Network
(
35
◦
, 90
◦
) [(θ(e))T(
ϕ(e)
)T
]
=

[
92.18 91.54 91.88 96.72 90.66 81.99 93.32 91.50
36.02 36.42 36.13 36.00 36.03 36.07 36.56 36.74
]
∆p = 20
◦[ 94.05 85.94 94.05 85.94 85.94 85.94 94.05 85.94
34.02 34.03 34.07 34.02 34.03 34.02 34.02 34.02
]
∆p = 10
◦[ 84.10 84.97 84.73 86.87 94.99 91.28 95.47 88.87
30.13 30.12 30.12 30.12 30.12 30.11 30.12 30.11
]
∆p = 0
◦
(
55
◦
, 90
◦
) [(θ(e))T(
ϕ(e)
)T
]
=

[ 114.25 129.26 62.07 63.40 118.09 113.27 64.72 70.00
−42.17 −43.39 −44.34 −50.01 −50.70 −44.34 −46.38 −41.88
]
∆p = 20
◦[
64.05 65.03 116.16 116.37 64.84 64.40 114.38 114.95
39.79 −34.00 −46.81 43.68 47.26 −48.34 35.78 −42.98
]
∆p = 10
◦[
76.81 127.90 98.78 95.53 95.14 78.60 58.68 109.30
61.70 −17.16 −64.91 30.57 −75.27 −35.15 60.26 −36.25
]
∆p = 0
◦
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Fig. 4. The minimum total power consumption as the function of the secrecy
rate threshold R0sec under different polarization distances ∆p. The DOA of
sj is (35
◦, 90◦).
for sj are (αj , βj) ∈ {(−30◦, 0◦), (−20◦, 0◦), (−30◦, 20◦)],
corresponding to three polarization distances ∆p = 0
◦, 20◦
and 40◦, respectively. It is obvious that the minimum total
power consumption is a monotonously increasing function of
the required secrecy rate R0sec, as clearly indicated in Fig. 4.
Also observe from Fig. 4 that for the PSA, increasing ∆p
leads to reduction in the total power consumption, which
confirms that the polarization difference between the two
signals is beneficial to improve the power efficiency of the
PSA based SIMO network. As a comparison, the minimum
total power consumption required by the CSA based SIMO
network with the POA of sj given by (−30◦, 0◦) is also
plotted in Fig. 4, where it can be seen that the CSA needs
consume more than 4 dB of power to achieve the required
R0sec, compared with the PSA. This is because the CSA
cannot utilize the signals’ polarization information to improve
performance.
We then change the DOA of sj to (10
◦, 90◦), and repeat
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Fig. 5. The minimum total power consumption as the function of the secrecy
rate threshold R0sec under different polarization distances ∆p. The DOA of
sj is (10◦, 90◦).
the same experiment. The results obtained are shown in Fig. 5.
Compared with Fig. 4, we observe that the power consump-
tions of the both CSA-based and PSA-based SIMO networks
are greatly reduced, because we have a large spatial difference
∆a = 30
◦ between sd and sj . From Fig. 5, it can be seen that
the three minimum power consumption curves of the PSA
for the three different polarization distances ∆p become very
close. This phenomenon demonstrates that the polarization
difference ∆p has little effect on the network performance
when the two signals have a sufficiently large spatial distance.
The results of Fig. 5 again confirm the advantage of the PSA
over the CSA, as the former achieves 2 dB saving in power
consumption in comparison with the latter.
Additionally, Fig. 6 depicts the minimum total power con-
sumption of the PSA SIMO network as the function of DOA
(θj , 90
◦) of sj under three different polarization distances ∆p
and given the secrecy rate threshold R0sec = 2.5 bits/s/Hz. It
can be seen that as the DOA difference between sd and sj ,
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Fig. 8. The achievable secrecy rate as the function of the DOA (θj , 90◦)
of sj given the polarization distance ∆p = 0 and the total transmit power
Pmax = 14 dB. Note that the range of θj is expanded from 90
◦ to 180◦ .
∆a → 0, the power consumption reaches the highest value.
Again, increasing the polarization distance ∆p leads to the
reduction in power consumption, as clearly shown in Fig. 6.
Furthermore, when the spatial separation ∆a is sufficiently
large, the influence of the polarization difference ∆p to power
consumption becomes very small.
2) Secrecy rate maximization: In this investigation, we
set the POA of sj to (αj , 0
◦). The polarization distance
between sd and sj is given by ∆p = 2|αj + 30◦|. Fig. 7
depicts the achievable secrecy rates of the PSA based SIMO
network as the functions of the DOA (θj , 90
◦) of sj , given
Pmax = P
max
S + P
max
J = 12 dB. It can be seen that for a
given ∆p, the achievable secrecy rate is reduced rapidly as
the spatial separation between sd and sj , ∆a = |θj − 400|,
decreases, and when ∆a → 0, the achievable secrecy rate
reaches the minimum value. It is also clear that the achievable
secrecy rate increases with the increase of the polarization
separation∆p. Moreover, the influence of∆p to the achievable
secrecy rate is particularly strong when the two signals are near
spatially inseparable, while the influence of ∆p becomes very
small when the signals are sufficiently separable in the spatial
domain. Note that at ∆p = 0 and ∆a = 0, the secrecy rate
is zero. As a comparison, the secrecy rate of the CSA-based
SIMO network under ∆p = 0
◦ is also given in Fig. 7, where
it is apparent that the PSA significantly outperforms the CSA.
Next we increase Pmax to 14 dB and expand the range of θj
from [0◦, 90◦] to [0◦, 180◦]. Given ∆p = 0, Fig. 8 compares
the achievable secrecy rate of the PSA SIMO network with
that of the CSA SIMO network. As expected, both the PSA
and CSA attain a zero secrecy rate at θj = 40
◦, as at this point,
both ∆a = 0 and ∆p = 0. However, it is further noticed that
for the CSA, the secrecy rate also deteriorates to zero when
the DOA of sj is (140
◦, 90◦). This is owing to the symmetric
fuzzification and is referred to as grating lobe. By contrast, the
secure communication of the SIMO network employing PSA
is realized without introducing grating lobes, which is another
significant advantage of the PSA over the CSA.
B. The Relaying Network
We now investigate the secure communication of the relay
aided network. The DOAs and POAs of the incident signals
s˜d and s˜j are the same as those given in Section V-A for the
SIMO network. We concentrate on the maximum secrecy rate
of the relaying network obtained by the iterative algorithm
proposed in Section IV-A, assuming a perfect realization of
the PSA pointing vector, but the robust design with imperfect
realization of the PSA pointing vector is also studied.
1) The secrecy rate maximization for the relaying network:
First, we demonstrate the convergence of our proposed itera-
tive optimization algorithm given in Section IV-A. Specifically,
we choose the POA (0◦, 0◦) for s˜j , i.e., we consider the case
of ∆p = 2|αj +30◦| = 60◦, and we set Ps = 14 dB, PmaxR =
25 dB and PmaxJ = 10 dB. Fig. 9 depicts the convergence
performance of the proposed iterative optimization algorithm
under both the spatially separable and spatially inseparable
cases. It can be seen from Fig. 9 that for the case of ∆a > 0,
the algorithm takes l = 3 outer iterations to converge, while
for the case of ∆a = 0, the algorithm converges within l = 6
outer iterations. Moreover, the choice of the initial p˜(0) does
not seem to affect the algorithm’s convergence performance.
In Fig. 10, the achievable secrecy rate of the PSA relaying
network is depicted as the function of the source transmit
power PS , under different DOA (θj , 90
◦) and POA (αj , 0
◦)
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Fig. 9. Convergence performance of the proposed iterative algorithm for
relaying network, given Ps = 14 dB, PmaxR = 25 dB and P
max
J
= 10 dB.
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Fig. 10. The achievable secrecy rate of the PSA based relaying network
as the function of source transmit power PS under different DOA and POA
settings of s˜j with P
max
J
= 10 dB and Pmax
R
= 25 dB.
of jammer signal s˜j with the maximum relay power P
max
R =
25 dB and the maximum jammer power PmaxJ = 10 dB.
Obviously, the achievable secrecy rate is a monotonically
increasing function of PS but it exhibits a saturation trend
for large PS . This is because increasing PS also increases
the information leakage from source S to eavesdropper E,
while the relay transmit power PmaxR is limited. Therefore,
the achievable secrecy rate cannot go arbitrarily high. With the
DOA of s˜j given by (65
◦, 90◦), which is distinguishable from
the DOA (40◦, 90◦) of s˜d, the influence of the polarization
distance ∆p between s˜d and s˜j on the achievable secrecy
rate is very small. However, when s˜j and s˜d are spatially
inseparable with ∆a = 0
◦, the influence of ∆p becomes
significant, and a larger∆p leads to a larger achievable secrecy
rate. Also observe from Fig. 10 that under the condition of
∆a = 0
◦ and ∆p = 0
◦, the achievable secrecy rate of the
PSA relaying network is very small.
Fig. 11 compares the achievable secrecy rates of the PSA
and CSA relaying networks given the DOA (θj , 90
◦) for s˜j
with θj ∈ [0◦, 90◦], PmaxJ = 10 dB and PS = 15 dB. In this
case, the POA of s˜j is given by (αj , 0
◦), and the polarization
distance between s˜d and s˜j is ∆p = 2|αj + 30◦|. The results
of Fig. 11 demonstrate that the PSA based relaying network
significantly outperforms the CSA based relaying network, in
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Fig. 11. The achievable secrecy rate of the relay network as the function
of the DOA (θj , 90◦) of s˜j under different polarization differences ∆p and
given Pmax
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= PS = 10 dB and P
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= 25 dB.
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terms of achievable secrecy rate. Similar to the SIMO network
case, at ∆a = 0
◦, the achievable secrecy rates of both the
PSA and CSA relaying networks deteriorate to their minimum
values. In particular, under the condition of ∆a = 0
◦ and
∆p = 0
◦, the secrecy rate of the CSA relaying network is zero
but the secrecy rate of the PSA relaying network is a small
nonzero value. Furthermore, by increasing the polarization
separation∆p to nonzero, the secrecy rate of the PSA relaying
network can be increased considerably, because the PSA can
effectively utilize the polarization information.
2) Robust design with imperfect realization of the PSA
pointing: We next illustrate our robust beamforming optimiza-
tion design for the PSA relaying network with imperfect
PSA pointing realization. We set the PSA pointing error
bound to C = 100I3NR . In order to reduce the computation
complexity, we consider the 4-antenna PSA. In Fig. 12, the
achievable secrecy rates of three designs as the functions of
the maximum source transmit power PS are depicted, given
different DOA and POA conditions for s˜j with the 4-antenna
PSA as well as PmaxJ = 10 dB and P
max
R = 25 dB. Based
on the secrecy rate maximization of Section IV-A, we can
obtain the optimal design ofW ⋆ and p˜⋆. If the PSA pointing
implementation is perfect, we can realize the exact optimal
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PSA pointing solution p˜⋆, which is the curve under the title
‘Perfect PSA’ in Fig. 12. However, in practice, there usually
exists PSA pointing implementation error, and the optimal
design of p˜⋆ is actually implemented as p˜⋆ + ∆p˜, which
is the curve under the title ‘Non-robust PSA’ in Fig. 12.
Obviously, this implementation is far from optimal, and the
actual secrecy rate achieved is significantly lower than that
obtained with the perfect implementation of p˜⋆. Under the
imperfect implementation of p˜⋆+∆p˜, our robust beamforming
optimization design presented in Section IV-B is capable of re-
gaining considerable secrecy rate performance, which is shown
in Fig. 12 under the title ‘Robust PSA’.
C. Extension to the PSA based eavesdropper
As mentioned before, our work can also be easily extended
to the case where the PSA is deployed at the eavesdropper.
Note that the PSA-based eavesdropper can effectively suppress
the interference with approximate spatial properties as the
source, and further improve the wiretap capability. In order to
illustrate the good performance of the PSA-based eavesdrop-
per, we perform the following two simulations for total power
minimization and secrecy rate maximization, respectively.
Particularly, we assume that the eavesdropper is equipped
with a PSA with NE = 6 antennas. Besides, the DOA
and POA of the desired signal sd impinging on PSA at
eavesdropper are assumed to be (30◦, 90◦) and (−30◦, 0◦),
respectively. For jammer signal sj , its DOA at eavesdropper
is (25◦, 90◦) and its POA is (αje, βje). Based on this, the
polarization distance at eavesdropper between sd and sj is
defined as ∆pe, which is similar to that of the polarization
distance at destination ∆p. Note that in the following two
simulations, ∆p = 20
0 is fixed. In Fig. 13, the total power
consumption of the SIMO network versus the secrecy rate
threshold R0sec under different polarization distances ∆pe is
studied. Here, both the eavesdropper equipped with the CSA
and PSA (also named CSA-Eve and PSA-Eve), are considered.
Firstly, we find that for both CSA-Eve and PSA-Eve, the total
power consumption increases with R0sec. Secondly, it is clear
that the total power consumption for PSA-Eve case increases
with ∆pe, which dues to the fact that the wiretap capability of
PSA-Eve is enhanced by enlarging the polarization distance
∆pe. More importantly, compared to the case of CSA-Eve,
the total power consumption for PSA-Eve case is evidently
higher under the arbitrary polarization distance ∆pe, which
indicates that more transmit power is required to suppress the
interception of PSA-Eve and further achieve the secrecy rate
threshold.
In Fig. 14, the achievable secrecy rate versus the DOA
(θj , 90
◦) of sj for both PSA-Eve and CSA-Eve case is shown.
The same parameters in Fig. 1 are adopted, and the total
transmit power PS + PJ = 12dB is assumed. Based on this,
we naturally find that for both PSA-Eve and CSA-Eve, when
the DOA (θj , 90
◦) of sj is near to that of the desired signal,
i.e. |θj − 400| < 10o, the secrecy rate performance evidently
deteriorates due to the similar spatial characteristics between
the desired signal and the jammer signal. Besides, with the
increase of polarization distance ∆pe, i.e., from ∆pe = 10
o
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to ∆pe = 20
o, the PSA-Eve can utilize more polarization
difference to improve the wiretap rate and further reduce the
achievable secrecy rate. More importantly, compared to the
case of CSA-Eve, the lower achievable secrecy rate of PSA-
Eve is observed, which is attributed to the better wiretap
capability of PSA-Eve.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a joint beamforming, power allocation and
PSA pointing optimization has been proposed for wireless
communications. Our main contribution has been to apply
the polarization sensitive array to improve the security perfor-
mance of wireless communications. Specifically, by utilizing
the polarization difference among signals, the interference
caused by jammer to destination is greatly reduced while the
information leakage to eavesdropper is minimized, even when
these signals are spatially indistinguishable. Two communica-
tion scenarios, the PSA based SIMO network and the PSA
16
aided relaying network, have been considered. For the former
scenario, both total transmit power minimization and secrecy
rate maximization have been performed. For the relaying
network assuming perfect CSI, both secrecy rate maximization
designs under perfect and imperfect PSA spatial pointing im-
plementations have been obtained. Since all the optimization
problems involved are nonconvex with complicated constraints
and/or objectives, alternative suboptimal algorithms have been
proposed which enable us to apply convex optimization
techniques to solve the transformed optimization problems
efficiently. Extensive simulation results have demonstrated the
effectiveness of our proposed PSA based techniques for
enhancing physical-layer security. In particular, it has been
shown that the improvement of maximum achievable secrecy
rate of wireless networks by the proposed PSA techniques
over the standard CSA techniques is remarkable.
APPENDIX
The convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm to solve
the optimization problem (31) was demonstrated in [29]. Here
we prove the convergence of this algorithm.
Firstly, we define the following objective function
f(Pc) = tr
(
Pc
)− λmax(Pc)− tr (ϑmaxϑHmax(Pc − Pc))
= tr
(
Pc
)− λmax(Pc). (99)
Then the lower bound of f(Pc) is zero according to the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 For an arbitrary square matrix A, it holds that
tr(A) − λmax(A) ≥ 0, in which the equality is guaranteed if
and only if rank(A) = 1 is satisfied.
Next, we modify f(Pc) into the following penalty function
f˜(P (t+1)c ) =min
Pc
tr(Pc)− λmax
(
P (t)c
)
− tr
(
ϑ(t)max
(
ϑ(t)max
)H(
Pc − P (t)c
))
, (100)
where tr(Pc) − λmax
(
P
(t)
c
) − tr(ϑ(t)max(ϑ(t)max)H(Pc − P (t)c ))
is the objective function in the (t+ 1)th iteration of (31).
Let P
(t)
c be the optimal matrix obtained at the tth iteration
of (31). Using P
(t)
c in the iterative optimization procedure
yields the optimal matrix P
(t+1)
c at the (t + 1)th iteration,
which is feasible. Clearly, the optimized f˜
(
P
(t+1)
c
)
satisfies
f˜
(
P (t+1)c
)
=tr
(
P (t+1)c
)− λmax(P (t)c )
− tr
(
ϑ(t)max
(
ϑ(t)max
)H(
P (t+1)c − P (t)c
))
≤tr(P (t)c )− λmax(P (t)c )
− tr
(
ϑ(t)max
(
ϑ(t)max
)H(
P (t)c − P (t)c
))
=f
(
P (t)c
)
. (101)
For an arbitrary Hermitian matrixZ, the following relationship
holds
tr
(
ϑmaxϑ
H
max
(
Z − P (t)c
))
= ϑHmaxZϑmax − ϑHmaxP (t)c ϑmax
=ϑHmaxZϑmax−λmax
(
P (t)c
)≤λmax(Z)−λmax(P (t)c ). (102)
Therefore, we further obtain
λmax
(
P (t+1)c
)− λmax(P (t)c ) ≥
tr
(
ϑ(t)max
(
ϑ(t)max
)H(
P (t+1)c −P (t)c
))
. (103)
Based on (103), the function f
(
P
(t+1)
c
)
satisfies
f
(
P (t+1)c
)
= tr
(
P (t+1)c
)− λmax(P (t+1)c )
= tr
(
P (t+1)c
)−λmax(P (t)c )+λmax(P (t)c )−λmax(P (t+1)c )
≤ tr(P (t+1)c )−λmax(P (t)c )−tr(ϑ(t)max(ϑ(t)max)H(P (t+1)c −P (t)c ))
≤ f(P (t)c ), (104)
where the first inequality and the second inequality hold due
to (103) and (101), respectively.
Thus, given an initial feasible P
(0)
c , the optimization prob-
lem (31) can be iteratively solved to obtain a sequence P
(t)
c ,
t = 1, 2, · · · , whose rank approaches 1. Since this iteration
procedure is monotonically decreasing, in terms of the objec-
tive function f
(
P
(t)
c
)
, as shown in (104), which has a lower
bound of zero based on Lemma 1, it is naturally converged.
Consequently, we conclude that the iterative optimization
problem (31) based on the penalty function method converges
to a rank-1 solution.
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